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GLOBAL FINANCIAL STANDARD SETTING, 
THE G10 COMMITTEES, AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
Kern Alexander* 
INTRODUCTION 
he global financial and credit crisis of 2007–2009 has highlighted 
the important role of the G10 committees in setting international 
standards for the regulation of bank capital adequacy, payment systems, 
and related issues pertaining to global financial stability.  The main three 
G10 committees—consisting of the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (“Basel Committee” or “BCBS”), the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (“CPSS”), and the Committee on the Global Finan-
cial System—are the most influential international financial standard-
setting bodies and exercise either direct or indirect influence over the 
development of banking and payment system law and regulation for all 
developed countries and most developing countries. Specifically, the Ba-
sel Committee has produced a number of important international agree-
ments that regulate the amount of capital that banks must set aside 
against their risk-based assets, and the allocation of jurisdictional respon-
sibility for bank regulators in overseeing the international operations of 
banks. Its activities have usually been kept away from the fanfare of high 
politics, but its recent efforts to amend the 1988 Basel Capital Accord by 
adopting the Basel II Capital Agreement (“Basel II”) and to extend its 
application to all countries where international banks operate have at-
tracted significant critical comment and brought its work under close 
scrutiny by leading policymakers and regulators. The CPSS has created 
important agreements setting forth principles and recommendations for 
the regulation of bank payment systems and for the regulation of clearing 
and settlement of securities trading, and recommendations regarding 
counterparties. The Committee on Global Financial Systems, though it 
has not yet adopted regulatory principles or recommendations, has pro-
duced a number of influential reports that have influenced the debate on 
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the credit crisis and have analyzed other issues that affect financial sta-
bility. 
This Article considers the role of these Committees in influencing the 
development of international financial law norms that govern domestic 
law standards, and rules of banking and financial regulation. This Article 
also examines how the Committees’ decision making influences interna-
tional norms of banking regulation and constitutes an alternative form of 
international lawmaking. In particular, it will focus on the decision mak-
ing of the Basel Committee and address how its decision-making process 
led to the adoption of Basel II and how Basel II has put the global finan-
cial system at serious risk. Finally, this Article suggests that the voluntary, 
nonlegally binding decision-making process of these Committees has 
important international public policy implications because of the influ-
ence they exert on the development of national banking law and regula-
tion, and on the stability of financial markets. 
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 
International economic law has become important for economic poli-
cymakers who seek to design legal rules by which to manage the growth 
of global economic interdependence.1 In 1965, Vellas defined the foun-
dations of international economic law as “dynamic and evolutionary,” in 
contrast to the traditional sources of “general public international law,” 
which he found to be more primitive because they are limited to elemen-
tary relationships, such as the concept of state sovereignty; these rela-
tionships have made filling in the gaps in international legal rules and 
principles extremely difficult.2 Vellas further noted that international 
economic law is characterized by the specific qualities that constitute a 
supranational legal order, an empirical and nonformalistic order, one of 
pragmatism, realism, flexibility, and mobility.3 
More recently, Lowenfeld suggested that international economic law 
should be considered all “rules . . . [that] have been developed against the 
                                                                                                             
 1. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 222 & nn.2, 4–5 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (with further references). 
 2. The U.S. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations defines international econom-
ic law as “all the international law and international agreements governing economic 
transactions that cross state boundaries or that otherwise have implications for more than 
one state, such as those involving the movement of goods, funds, persons, intangibles, 
technology, vessels or aircraft.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES pt. 8, intro (1987). 
 3. PIERRE VELLAS, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL [INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LAW] 21–34 (1965) (Fr.). 
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backdrop of the theory of international trade, and . . . the question—
sometimes explicit, at other times tacit—how far deviations from the 
theory should be allowed.”4 A broader doctrine of international economic 
law includes the role of money, exchange rates, and the balance of pay-
ments, in addition to related areas concerning international finance. Ac-
cording to this view, international economic law covers many specialized 
areas such as trade in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) agree-
ments, and finance and monetary policy under the Bretton Woods 
Agreements, as well as the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”), the U.N. Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law, and the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”). 
Also, international economic law is usually governed by bilateral and 
multilateral agreements rather than custom or general principles of law.5 
International financial law has been defined as covering both the pri-
vate law relationships of banking and financial services and the public 
international law of currency and foreign exchange arrangements.6 The 
inclusion of international financial law in the broader regime of interna-
tional economic law, as well as the emergence of the specialized field of 
international monetary law, can be attributed to the works of the late Sir 
Joseph Gold.7 Indeed, according to Gold, the purpose of international 
monetary law is to form “a complex of relationships among countries on 
matters . . . that are governed by rules and understandings that are more 
extensive than international monetary law as a branch of public interna-
tional law.”8 
Global economic law has also been interpreted as a self-replicating 
process in which legal norms arise from nonstate actors, such as associa-
tions of private market participants and multinational corporations that 
operate on a transnational basis. Teubner and others, building on Eh-
                                                                                                             
 4. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 8 (2003). 
 5. Cf. MALANCZUK, supra note 1, at 223. 
 6. See ROSA M. LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
STABILITY 18–20 (2006). See also Stephen Zamora & Sir Joseph Gold, Development of 
International Monetary Law, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SIR JOSEPH GOLD 439 & n.2 
(Werner F. Ebke & Joseph J. Norton eds., 1990) (providing further references) (discuss-
ing international financial law as “encompassing both private and public international 
law, the private law of international banking relationships, national regulation of financial 
transactions, and the public international law of money, including the rules of the IMF”). 
 7. Sir Joseph was the IMF’s General Counsel from 1960 to 1979, and was the draf-
ter of the First and Second Amendments to the IMF Articles of Agreement. See Kenneth 
W. Dam, Introduction, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SIR JOSEPH GOLD, supra note 6, at 
17–19; Zamora, supra note 6, at 440. 
 8. Zamora, supra note 6, at 446. Gold argued that the IMF administered a legal re-
gime. Id. 
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rlich’s “Bukowina,” argue that a modern lex mercatoria has emerged 
outside public law sources and relatively insulated from state institutions 
to constitute a new “trans-national law of economic transactions.”9 A 
theory of legal pluralism can explain this global nonstate law governing 
commercial and economic transactions that has arisen from diverse social 
systems and is subject to “a highly asymmetric process of legal self-
reproduction.”10 For example, the model contracts for cross-border in-
vestments, such as project finance or financial services between wholesale 
counterparties, are often governed by terms that do not have a necessary 
link to a national legal system. Moreover, accountants and lawyers have 
agreed to use transnational rule-making processes to govern multination-
al insolvencies. Similarly, the internal legal regimes of multinational 
corporations are often devised independently of any one country’s corpo-
rate law and apply sui generis to particular areas of corporate activity. 
This has also been recognised in the area of labour relations, where mul-
tinational firms adopt agreements to govern employee relations with 
transnational labor unions that are outside the laws of any state legal sys-
tem. 
The generation of international economic norms has also been analyzed 
through various institutional perspectives. For instance, Slaughter de-
scribes the current global order as a world of “disaggregated” States rather 
than the traditional realist notion of unitary States.11 These disaggregated 
states interact with each other not only through foreign ministries, but 
also through regulatory, judicial, substate, and legislative bodies.12 She 
views this “network” system as a novel development in response to glo-
balization. Networks involve mainly government officials who create 
links across national borders and between national and supranational in-
stitutions. These networks perform a variety of functions, including the 
facilitation of information collection and sharing, technical assistance, 
and coordination of cross-border enforcement. The scope of these net-
works can be bilateral, plurilateral, regional, or global, and they interact 
with a wide range of international organizations, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and civil society movements.13 Upon closer analysis, how-
ever, the novelty of the “network” theory is undermined by the fact that 
economic, financial, and commercial diplomacy has been conducted 
through interstate networks since the early nineteenth century and, there-
                                                                                                             
 9. Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in 
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). 
 10. Id. at 11. 
 11. ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER 5 (2004). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 5–6. 
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fore, is not a new form of international cooperation.14 Nevertheless, as 
Howse observes, the theory of networks helps to “keep in perspective the 
role of international law and international institutions in contrast to other 
mechanisms and tools of governance.”15 
II. GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SETTING 
State borders no longer contain and define economic activity.16 While 
sovereign nation states regulate domestic markets, advances in transpor-
tation and communication links, which require transnational management 
and international regulation, facilitate cross-border trade in goods, ser-
vices, capital, and labor. The growth of financial markets, cross-border 
capital flows, and financial transactions has led States to create multila-
teral institutions and international standard-setting bodies to attempt to 
regulate the cross-border activities of transnational corporations and other 
firms, and to control and minimize the cross-border externalities produced 
by certain types of economic and financial risk taking.17 It is recognized 
that the influence of these multilateral institutions and standard-setting 
bodies has grown immensely and that many States have responded by 
building parallel structures to counterbalance their influence.18 This has 
raised several questions: how state decision-making and standard-setting 
practices should be regulated in these multilateral institutions; what type 
of legal competency States should exercise when engaged in standard 
setting; and what the optimal allocation of competency is between inter-
national and state-level actors. 
Although nation states remain the principal actors in public interna-
tional law, it is widely accepted today that legal personality can extend to 
international organizations and, in certain circumstances, to other non-
state actors, such as individuals and juridical or corporate persons.19 Sov-
                                                                                                             
 14. Extensive networks of economic, financial, and central bank policymakers were 
involved in the negotiations leading up to the London Conference in 1932 on currency 
and trade arrangements, as well as in the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions in 
1944, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. 
 15. Robert Howse, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 231, 232 (2007). 
 16. JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK ch. 1 (1999). 
 17. For a discussion of the negative externality of systemic risk in financial systems 
and its cross-border dimension, see KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN 
EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULA-
TION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 23–25 (2006). 
 18. See ALVIN LEROY BENNETT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND 
ISSUES 265 (1996). See also Ngaire Woods, The Political Economy of Globalization, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 4–5 (Ngaire Woods ed., 2000). 
 19. IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 13 (2nd rev. ed. 
1992). 
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ereign States also continue to be the main actors in economic policy and 
regulation, usually in both formal international economic organizations, 
such as the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the WTO, and in-
ternational financial standard-setting bodies, such as the G10 commit-
tees, which include the Basel Committee. In these international institu-
tions, States typically establish the initial terms of reference and decide 
on membership for States, interstate organizations, and nonstate actors, 
as well as approve the financing and general operational oversight of 
these international bodies and organizations. States, though, are finding it 
increasingly difficult to regulate and manage cross-border trading activi-
ties and financial transactions, given the new modes of production,  
distribution, and consumption, and the rising interconnectedness of gov-
ernments, societies, and private actors in the world economy. Indeed the 
forces of globalization are changing the structure of the world economy 
and are posing major regulatory challenges for States.20 
As a response to the growing cross-border flow of goods, services, 
ideas, and people, States have sought to enhance their management and 
surveillance of cross-border economic activities by coordinating their 
economic and financial policies with other States through international 
organizations and multilateral institutions. States have also facilitated the 
rise and transformation of domestic corporations and firms into multina-
tional enterprises, thus creating new and influential entities at the interna-
tional level. For international financial markets, the process of globaliza-
tion has been no different. Expansion, diversification, and international 
coordination of banking activities and operations have been transformed 
with the increase of “global competition among bank and non-bank fi-
nancial intermediaries” and have resulted in the rise of global financial 
service companies and the consolidation and conglomeration of the 
banking and financial services industry.21 
                                                                                                             
 20. See, e.g., Jost Delbrück, Structural Changes in the International System and Its 
Legal Order: International Law in the Era of Globalization, in 11 SCHWEIZERISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPÄISCHES RECHT 1, 16 (2001) (Switz.) (defin-
ing globalization “as the process or the processes of denationalization/deterritorialization 
of politics, markets, and laws or, more specifically, process of denationaliza-
tion/deterritorialization of clusters of political, economic and social transactions involving 
national and international actors, public and private, leading to a global interconnected-
ness of these actors in time and space including individuals”). 
 21. See Joseph J. Norton, The Multidimensions of the Convergence Processes Re-
garding the Prudential Supervision of International Banking Activities: The Impact of the 
Basel Supervisors Committee’s Efforts Upon, Within and Without the European Commu-
nity, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SIR JOSEPH GOLD, supra note 6, at 249. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SETTING AND THE G10 COMMITTEES 
In contrast to international economic organizations such as the WTO,22 
or BIS,23 international standard-setting bodies are not entities with sepa-
rate legal personality created by States, but rather informal associations 
of state representatives and/or professionals that meet to address specific 
problems or to identify issues of concern. In international finance, the 
globalization of financial services has necessitated that regulators devel-
op cooperative relations to facilitate their oversight and regulation of 
banking and financial services. Beginning in 1962, the central banks of 
the ten leading industrialized nations, as well as the Swiss National 
Bank, began to meet regularly at the BIS and other venues to coordinate 
central bank policy and to organize lending to each other through the 
General Arrangements to Borrow.24 These ten countries plus the Swiss 
National Bank became known as the Group of Ten or G10.25 Goodhart 
has described the relationship of the G10 with one of its standard-setting 
committees—the Basel Committee—as one of delegated authority to 
engage in regulatory standard setting: 
Having established a standing committee of specialists in this field, the 
G-10 Governors would find it difficult to reject a proposal from them, 
especially on a technical matter. The relationships between the G-10 
Governors and the BCBS emerge from the analysis of what the BCBS 
actually did and were quite complex. The G-10 Governors set priorities 
for work, and frequently required papers to be revised and reconsi-
dered. But at the same time they often gave the BCBS considerable 
                                                                                                             
 22. The WTO was created by the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
which adopted the WTO Agreements. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144. 
 23. The BIS is an international organization created under the Hague Agreements of 
1930 and the Constituent Charter of the Bank for International Settlements of 1930. It 
was established in the context of the Young Plan, which dealt with the reparation pay-
ments imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles following the First World War. 
See JAMES C. BAKER, THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS: EVOLUTION AND 
EVALUATION 34 (2002). The BIS served as the payment agent for the European Payments 
Union, which facilitated the restoration of currency convertibility for the western Euro-
pean countries following the Second World War. For more on the European Payment 
Union, see DANIEL GROS & NIELS THYGESEN, EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 4–8 
(1998). 
 24. For a discussion of the General Arrangements to Borrow, see Kern Alexander, 
The Fund’s Role in Sovereign Liquidity Crises, in 5 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONE-
TARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 131, 140–46. 
 25. The G10 central banks today consist of the central governors of eleven coun-
tries—Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Swiss National Bank, United Kingdom, and United States—as well as the Euro-
pean Central Bank. 
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freedom to decide its own agenda, and frequently rubber-stamped the 
papers emerging; basically the Governors did not have the time or the 
desire for textual criticism. They had a general oversight role; the detail 
was to be hammered out in the BCBS.26 
The G10 established several committees whose secretariats were based 
at the BIS. The first of these committees was the Eurocurrency Standing 
Committee. Founded in 1962, it was formed to monitor and assess the 
operations of the then newly established Euro-currency markets. This 
Committee later became the Committee on the Global Financial System 
in 1971. It now deals with broader issues of systemic risk and financial 
stability. The best-known Committee, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulation and Supervisory Practices, was established in 1974, and to-
day is known as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Finally, 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems was formed in 1990 
to negotiate and set standards to support the continued functioning of 
payment and settlement systems.27 
These Committees have examined many important economic policy 
and financial regulatory issues, as well as elaborated and promulgated 
best practices in supervision and regulation, the functioning of payment, 
settlement systems, and the overall operation of financial markets. The 
Committees are usually chaired by senior officials of member central 
banks and are composed of experts from central banks, regulatory au-
thorities, and finance ministries. In the case of the BCBS, members also 
include noncentral bank supervisory authorities and other regulatory and 
economic policy experts. Members of the Committees have voting power 
and decision-making authority, while non-G10 country representatives 
are often consulted for their views on a variety of regulatory and eco-
nomic issues. Frequently, special initiatives are undertaken to share ex-
perience with, and invite the opinions of, those not directly involved in 
the work of the Committees. In promoting cooperation in their respective 
areas, the Committees determine their own agenda and, within their 
mandate, operate independently from their host organization, the BIS, 
                                                                                                             
 26. CHARLES A.E. GOODHART, A HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at ch. 14, on file with author). 
 27. The CPSS adopted the Core Principles of Systemically Important Payment Sys-
tems, CPSS Publications, No. 43 (Jan 2001). See also CPSS, Recommendations for Secur-
ities Settlement Systems, CPSS Publications, No. 46 (Nov. 2001). Three other secretariats 
for international financial standard setting bodies operate out of the BIS: the Financial 
Stability Board (“FSB”) (originally established as the Financial Stability Forum in 1999), 
the International Association of Deposit Insurers (“IADI”), and the International Associa-
tion of Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”). 
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which only provides its good offices for meetings as well as administra-
tive and research support. 
Significantly, these Committees have resolved not to adopt legally 
binding international standards in a public international law sense, but 
rather to influence domestic regulatory law, practices and standards by 
adopting what has become known as “international soft law.” Indeed, 
Giovanoli, examining some of the issues in the international soft law de-
bate as it relates to financial regulation and markets, has observed that 
[f]rom the institutional point of view, the new international financial 
system involves a great number and variety of institutions, entities and 
bodies which are directly or indirectly concerned with setting interna-
tional financial standards. In other words, the new system is decentra-
lized, although some institutions, in particular the IMF, have a promi-
nent position as a result of their strong institutional basis and broad 
membership. The legal status of the multitude of entities involved varies 
significantly. The [international financial institutions] are fully-fledged 
international organizations, while the ‘Gs’ (G–7, G–10 or G–20) are de 
facto groupings created at the initiative of the governments of a number 
of states and meeting at different levels. There also are sector-specific 
international groupings of supervisors and regulators, central bank ex-
perts’ committees and other groupings such as the FSF. However, what 
all these bodies have in common is the fact that, as a whole, they have 
no competence with regard to law-making or rule-making at either the 
national or international level.28 
The Basel Committee has been the most important G10 committee 
with respect to its impact on developing legally nonbinding international 
financial standards. In December 1974, the Basel Committee was formed 
by the G10 central bankers to respond to a financial crisis that had arisen 
from the collapse of the German bank Herstatt, which had led to signifi-
                                                                                                             
 28. Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal 
Aspects of International Financial Standard Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: 
ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3, 11 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000). The FSF was estab-
lished by the G7 in 1999 in response to the Asian financial crisis, partly to coordinate the 
work of the multifarious bodies already established, including the BCBS and the various 
departments of the OECD. See Financial Stability Forum, History, http://www.financial 
stabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last visited June 3, 2009). The FSF Compendium of 
Standards with a summary and classification of the most significant rules, best practices, 
principles, and guidelines of international financial regulation. They are categorized 
based on twelve key standards, which are broken into three categories: macroeconomic 
policy and data transparency; institutional and market infrastructure; and financial regula-
tion and supervision. See Financial Stability Forum, Compendium of Standards, 12 Key 
Standards for Sound Financial Systems, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_ 
standards.htm (last visited June 3, 2009). See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 459–60. 
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cant problems with foreign exchange and settlement risk between U.S. 
and European banks. In the same year, the U.S. Franklin National Bank 
became insolvent and posed a risk to counterparty banks because of its 
miscalculations of foreign exchange risk in the wholesale loan market. 
Both of these crises exposed substantial gaps in the ability of central 
bankers and national regulators to control and manage a crisis with cross-
border effects. The Basel Committee adopted a Concordat, in February 
1975, that established principles of information exchange and coordina-
tion for the oversight of the cross-border operations of banking institu-
tions.29 The 1975 Concordat was amended in 1983, in response to the 
collapse and insolvency of the Italian bank Banco Ambrosiano.30 The 
1983 Revised Concordat contained the principle of consolidated supervi-
sion; this principle provides that home country regulators shall have re-
sponsibility for ensuring that the transnational operations of their home 
country banks are sound regarding credit risk exposure, quality of assets, 
and the capital adequacy of the banking group’s global operations.31 
Later, following the Latin American sovereign debt crisis of the early 
1980s, and the resulting near collapse of several major U.S. banks be-
cause of their excessive lending to emerging market sovereigns, the Ba-
sel Committee adopted the 1988 Capital Accord, which established a 
minimum eight percent capital adequacy requirement on internationally 
active banks within G10 country jurisdictions.32 The Capital Accord was 
originally calculated based on a bank’s credit risk exposure, but was later 
                                                                                                             
 29. See GEORGE A. WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 87 (2001). 
 30. The 1983 Revised Concordat was entitled “Principles for the Supervision of 
Banks’ Foreign Establishments.” 
 31. See ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 47–48. 
 32. The 1988 Capital Accord’s original purpose was to prevent the erosion of bank 
capital ratios resulting from aggressive competition for market share by the leading banks 
during the 1980s. The Accord also hoped to harmonize the different levels and approach-
es to capital among the G10 countries. In adopting the 1988 Accord, banking regulators 
wanted to establish an international minimum standard that would create a level playing 
field for banks operating in the G10 countries, and banking regulators wanted capital 
requirements to reflect accurately the true risks facing banks in a deregulated and interna-
tionally competitive market. The 1988 Capital Accord required banks actively engaged in 
international transactions to hold capital equal to at least eight per cent of their risk-
weighted assets. This capital adequacy standard was intended to prevent banks from in-
creasing their exposure to credit risk by imprudently incurring greater leverage. The Ac-
cord was entitled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Stan-
dards,” and it applied, according to the principle of home-country control, to banks based 
in G10 countries with international operations. Basle Comm. on Banking, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, July 1988, http://www.bis. 
org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf?noframes=1. 
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amended in 1996 to include a bank’s market risk exposure (i.e., trading 
book exposure), thereby extending the eight percent capital adequacy 
requirement to a bank’s trading book activities.33 Between 1999 and 
2004, the Committee engaged in a lengthy and radical revision of the 
Accord known as “Basel II.” The revision was concluded in 2004, and 
the Committee published a final text of the revised Capital Accord in 
June 2004. 
Basel II aims to make regulatory capital more sensitive to the risks that 
banks face in the marketplace. In doing so, it allows banks, under most 
conditions, to hold less regulatory capital for their credit, market, and 
operational risk exposures. The global credit crisis, however, revealed 
that banks are also exposed to significant liquidity risks, especially in 
their off-balance sheet exposures. Basel II regulatory capital require-
ments fail to address the liquidity risks to which banks are exposed and 
also do not require banks to hold adequate capital for the systemic risk 
that their lending and risk-taking creates.34 These issues are now under 
review by the Basel Committee in light of the credit crisis. Having com-
mitted themselves to implementing Basel II into their domestic legal sys-
tems, the G10 countries have begun to do so or have already completed 
the implementation process.35 
A. Decision Making and Implementation 
The Basel Committee’s decision making operates on a consensus ba-
sis. Although the Committee’s decision making has traditionally been 
secretive and substantially relied on personal contacts, it has become 
more formalized in recent years because of the considerable attention 
given to the deliberations over Basel II.36 As discussed above, the Com-
                                                                                                             
 33. This was known as the “Market Risk Amendment 1996.” See ALEXANDER, supra 
note 17, at 38–39. 
 34. See KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
IN THE EU 2–7 IP/A/ECON/ST/2007-26 (Dec. 2007) (Commissioned Report by the EU 
Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs), available at http://www.euro 
parl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file=19191#search=%20Financial 
%20supervision [hereinafter FINANCIAL SUPERVISION]. 
 35. In Europe, the European Community adopted Basel II as EC law in 2006, when 
the Council of Ministers and the EU Parliament approved the Capital Requirements Di-
rective, which is contained in Council Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177) and 
2006/49/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177).  
 36. For instance, during the Basel II negotiations, the Committee put a number of 
issues for consultation on its website where it then engaged in a public dialogue through 
the publication of its quantitative impact studies, which, on a hypothetical basis, meas-
ured the impact of Basel II using the reports of a number of banks in both G10 and non-
G10 countries. 
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mittee’s decisions are legally nonbinding in a traditional public interna-
tional law sense and place a great deal of emphasis on decentralized im-
plementation and informal monitoring of member compliance.37 The 
Committee has sought to extend its informal network with banking regu-
lators outside the G10 through various consultation groups.38 It has con-
ducted seminars and consultations with banking regulators from over one 
hundred countries as part of the deliberations over adopting the Basel II 
agreement. Most recently, in response to criticism over Basel II and to 
the lack of accountability and legitimacy in its decision-making structure, 
the Committee expanded its membership from thirteen to twenty coun-
tries in March 2009.39  
Although some have viewed the informality of the Committee’s deci-
sion-making process as effective for developing international banking 
regulatory standards,40 others have considered it a constraint on effective 
implementation.41 As Goodhart has observed, “The way that the BCBS, 
under its various Chairmen, interpreted this constraint was that all pro-
posals for forward transmission to the G-10 Governors, and thence to the 
                                                                                                             
 37. Indeed, the Basel Committee states the following on the BIS website: 
The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authori-
ty, and its conclusions do not, and were never intended to, have legal force. Ra-
ther, it formulates broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends 
statements of best practice in the expectation that individual authorities will 
take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements—statutory or oth-
erwise—which are best suited to their own national systems. In this way, the 
Committee encourages convergence towards common approaches and common 
standards without attempting detailed harmonisation of member countries’ su-
pervisory techniques. 
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee and Its Member-
ship 1 (Jan. 2007), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. 
 38. The Core Principles Liaison Group remains the most important forum for dialo-
gue between the Committee and systemically-relevant non-G10 countries. Moreover, the 
BIS established the Financial Stability Institute to conduct outreach to non-G10 banking 
regulators by holding seminars and conferences on implementing international banking 
and financial standards. 
 39. See Bank for Int’l Settlements, Expansion of Membership Announced by the Basel 
Committee (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090313.htm (announcing that the 
Basel Committee decided on March 10–11, 2009, to expand its membership from thirteen 
to twenty countries by adding Australia, Brazil, China, India, South Korea, Mexico, and 
Russia). The BCBS’s expanded membership, however, does not apply to the membership 
of the G10 central bank governors, which remains the same with twelve developed coun-
tries plus the European Central Bank. 
 40. Patricia Jackson, Bank of Eng., Lecture at the Judge Institute of Management, 
University of Cambridge (Mar. 15, 2002). 
 41. See GOODHART, supra note 23. 
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wider community of regulators/supervisors around the world, had to be 
accepted consensually by all country members of the Committee.”42 As a 
consensus of all Committee members was required to adopt any stan-
dards or agreement, each country had a veto. According to Goodhart, 
however, this was in practice “somewhat less of a constraint than it 
might seem at first sight.”43 The smaller countries, for example, Benelux, 
Canada, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland, were reluctant to object to pro-
posals by the United States and United Kingdom and rarely took a mi-
nority position, “except on a matter of extreme national importance, an 
example of [which is] . . . banking secrecy for Switzerland.”44 Despite 
Japan’s substantial economic and financial influence, Goodhart notes 
that Japanese representatives on the Committee “usually remained quiet 
and withdrawn . . . partly due to their rapid turn-over of personnel, so 
they had little opportunity to build up expertise.”45 
Monitoring noncompliance has generally been a decentralized task that 
is the responsibility of Member States themselves, not international or-
ganizations, such as the BIS, or other international bodies.46 Nonetheless, 
the Committee monitors and reviews the Basel framework with a view to 
achieving greater uniformity in its implementation and convergence in 
substantive standards. Moreover, the Committee claims that the legitima-
cy of the international standards it adopts derives from a communiqué 
issued by the G7 Heads of State in 1998 that encouraged emerging econ-
omies to adopt “strong prudential standards” and “effective supervisory 
structures.”47 To ensure that its standards are adopted, the Committee 
expects the IMF and World Bank to play a surveillance role in oversee-
ing Member State adherence through its various conditionality programs. 
In addition, because most G10 countries are members of the European 
Union, they are required by EU law to implement the Capital Accord 
into domestic law.48 In fact, the only G10 countries not required by local 
law to implement the Capital Accord are Canada, Japan, and the United 
States.49 This extended application of the Basel Committee’s standards to 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See JOSEPH NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF BANKING 
SUPERVISION (1995). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Council Directive 2006/48/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177); Council Directive 2006/49/EC, 
2006 O.J. (L 177). 
 49. In fact, a major obstacle in negotiations over Basel II had been the initial reluc-
tance of the U.S. Congress and the refusal of some U.S. bank regulators to apply Basel II 
to most U.S. banks. The Federal Reserve, which has been an important supporter of Basel 
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non-G10 countries has raised questions regarding the accountability of 
its decision-making structure and its suitability for application in devel-
oping and emerging market economies.50 
As an international legal matter, the Basel Capital Accord and its 
amended version, Basel II, are not legally binding in any way for G10 
countries or other countries that adhere to it. The Capital Accord has 
been analyzed and classified as a form of “soft” law.51 On an institutional 
level, the BCBS has no authority to take a decision of its own and has no 
formal legal mandate. It merely serves as a forum for discussion amongst 
central bankers and bank supervisors. It voluntarily adopts common 
regulatory standards and suggested financial policies, but leaves it to the 
discretion of national authorities to implement them into their national 
systems.52 
The work of the Basel Committee does generate international stan-
dards of financial regulation, but these standards are not intended to have 
legally binding effect under public international law. Basel Committee 
standards only become legally effective when national authorities adopt 
                                                                                                             
II and has the authority to apply it to U.S. financial holding companies, has begun apply-
ing it to the largest of such companies, while all other U.S. credit institutions will follow 
a different implementation schedule that will result in Basel II being fully adopted by 
U.S. banks between 2013 and 2015. See Risk-based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequa-
cy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance; Domestic Capital Modifications, Advanced Notice 
of Proposed Rule-Making, 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 (Oct 6, 2005). 
 50. ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 135–37. 
 51. See id. ch. 3 (discussing international soft law). See also Giovanoli, supra note 
28, at 11–12. 
 52. Walker observes that 
[i]nternational standards have become of particular importance in recent years 
due to the need to develop some common or, at least, minimum level of rules 
and regulations in various core areas of modern financial and economic prac-
tice. In light of the difficulties that naturally arise in attempting to agree [to] 
any formal treaty, convention or similar formal prescriptive solution at the in-
ternational level, a more informal consensus based approach has to be at-
tempted, at least[] during the early stages until some basic common agreement 
(and supporting sense of self-interest and commitment) may be achieved. This 
will certainly be the case in many such sensitive and complex areas as interna-
tional bank and financial market control. A standards based approach also has 
the obvious advantage of flexibility and informality although this necessarily 
means that it suffers from the associated operational limitations of weak adop-
tion and compliance. The key issues that then arise with international standards 
are not with regard to legal classification and formal enforcement but with na-
tional adoption and implementation[,] and implementation review. 
GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, at xxiii (2000). 
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them into domestic law and regulation. Although there is a tendency to 
attribute international legal significance to the international standards 
generated by the various committees that meet at the BIS, the over-
whelming opinion of experts and policymakers clearly holds that the in-
ternational standards adopted by these committees are not legally binding 
in any sense. They are, however, important international norms that in-
fluence and shape state behavior and are an effective form of legally 
nonbinding international soft law that has significant public policy relev-
ance in the global financial governance debate. 
The Basel Committee’s capital adequacy standards and rules on con-
solidated supervision were intended to apply only to credit institutions 
based in G10 countries that had cross-border operations. But this 
changed in 1998 during the Asian financial crisis when, at the urging of 
the G7 finance ministers and the world’s largest financial institutions, 
which were lobbying for more market sensitive capital standards, the 
Basel Committee stated its intent to amend the Capital Accord and to 
begin working on Basel II with a view to making it applicable to all 
countries where banks operate on a cross-border basis. Many non-G10 
countries have incorporated the Basel standards into their regulatory 
frameworks for a variety of reasons, including strengthening the sound-
ness of their commercial banks, raising their credit rating in international 
financial markets, and achieving a universally recognized international 
standard. The IMF and World Bank have also required many countries to 
demonstrate adherence or a realistic effort to implement the Basel Ac-
cord in order to qualify for financial assistance as part of IMF Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs and World Bank Financial Sector Adjust-
ment Programs. Moreover, as a condition for obtaining a bank license, all 
G10 countries require foreign banks to demonstrate that their home coun-
try regulators have adopted the Capital Accord and other international 
agreements. International reputation and market signals are also impor-
tant in creating incentives for non-G10 countries to adopt the Capital Ac-
cord. Many non-G10 countries (including developing countries) have 
found it necessary to require their banks to adopt similar capital adequa-
cy standards in order to attract foreign investment as well as to stand on 
equal footing with international banks in global financial markets. 
B. The CPSS and the Committee on the Global Financial System 
The other G10 committees that serve as international financial standard 
setting bodies—the CPSS and the Committee on Global Financial Sys-
tem—have adopted standards, principles, codes, guidelines, frameworks, 
and reports that have had a significant impact on the development of do-
mestic public law standards, national regulations, and supervisory prac-
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tices. The CPSS consists of the G10 central bank officials who examine 
issues of payment system regulation as well as clearing and settlement of 
securities and foreign exchange transactions. The Committee undertakes 
specific studies in the field of payment and settlement systems at its own 
discretion or at the request of the G10 Governors. It has published sever-
al important sets of principles and recommendations in the areas of pay-
ment system regulation and clearing and settlement of securities.53 The 
Committee operates through a network of working groups. To address 
concerns that it is merely an exclusive committee of G10 central bankers, 
the Committee has in recent years developed relationships with other 
central banks, particularly those of emerging market economies, so that 
its work can have more influence with, and be influenced by, central 
banks outside the G10. The CPSS has also published a number of reports 
that have influenced the regulation of payment infrastructure and settle-
ment systems.54 As with the Basel Committee, the principles and rec-
ommendations issued by the CPSS are not legally binding, as regulators 
seek to agree on standards that different jurisdictions can flexibly imple-
ment into their regulatory regimes. Although these international stan-
dards are without legal effect, they provide an important set of interna-
tional norms that influence regulatory and supervisory practices and the 
standards for controls and oversight of financial infrastructure. 
Similarly, the Committee on Global Financial Systems monitors de-
velopments in global financial markets for the G10 central bank Gover-
nors. The G10 Governors have provided a mandate to the Committee to 
identify and assess potential sources of stress in global financial mar-
kets.55 The Committee engages in research to identify issues and threats 
to systemic stability in global financial markets, examine the structural 
underpinnings of financial markets, and promote improvements to the 
functioning and stability of these markets. Representatives of the G10 
monitor on a quarterly basis the discussions and reports issued by the 
                                                                                                             
 53. The CPSS’s publication of the Core Principles for Systemically Important Pay-
ment Systems, the CPSS/IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems, 
and the CPSS/IOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties has contributed to 
the set of standards, codes, and best practices that are deemed essential for strengthening 
the international financial system. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, CPSS 
Publications, http://www.bis.org/cpss/index.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2009). 
 54. The Committee has published various reports examining large-value funds trans-
fer systems, securities settlement systems, settlement mechanisms for foreign exchange 
transactions, clearing arrangements for exchange-traded derivatives, and retail payment 
instruments, including electronic money. Its “Red Book” on payment systems provides 
extensive information on the most important systems in the CPSS countries. 
 55. Bank for Int’l Settlements, Committee on the Global Financial System: Mandate, 
Feb. 8, 1999, http://www.bis.org/cgfs/mandate.htm. 
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Committee; they also work with the Committee to identify long-term 
research projects involving working groups, which consist of central 
bank and regulatory staff, and the drafting of various reports. 
Other international supervisory bodies have also played a key role in 
developing international standards and rules for the regulation of finan-
cial markets. The International Association of Deposit Insurers meets at 
the BIS and discusses and adopts international principles and standards 
that govern deposit insurance regulation. In the area of money laundering 
and terrorist financing, the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”) has attained a high profile role in setting international stan-
dards (so-called recommendations) of disclosure and transparency for the 
regulation of banks, financial service providers, and other businesses in 
order to combat the global problem of financial crime.56 The FATF and 
the Basel Committee have each played a much more prominent role in 
their respective international regulatory standard-setting functions as 
compared to the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“IOSCO”) and the IAIS. In recent years, however, IOSCO and the IAIS 
have attracted much more policy attention since their standards and rec-
ommendations have been recognized by the IMF and World Bank as in-
ternational benchmarks against which IMF and World Bank member 
countries are assessed for compliance in their financial sector assessment 
programs. 
As discussed above, these international standard-setting bodies have 
been characterized as “networks” of international technical experts. But, 
it is submitted that their role is much larger than narrow technical ex-
perts, as they influence the development of broader economic policy and 
their negotiations and standard setting is more accurately characterized 
as a form of financial diplomacy. Although they are at the “coal face” of 
technical and regulatory standard setting, the goal of these regulatory 
technicians in international bodies is to devise broader international stan-
dards that govern the operations of financial markets and the many fi-
nancial firms—banks, securities and insurance companies—in those 
markets with an important impact on the broader macroeconomy. These 
national regulators and supervisors—mainly from developed countries—
use international standard-setting bodies to influence not only technical 
areas of regulation, but also broader areas of financial development. This 
                                                                                                             
 56. Other important international standard setting bodies include the International 
Accounting Standards Board and the International Federation of Accountants, which are 
composed of non-state representatives that include professional accountants and academ-
ics who devise international accounting standards for the accounting industry. Similarly, 
the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board sets standards for international 
financial reporting. 
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is especially the case with the creation of the G20 and the enhanced fi-
nancial policy role of the FSB and the broader policy agenda for the Ba-
sel Committee with respect to the Core Principles of Banking Supervi-
sion. The G20, the FSB, and the G10 committees are all playing high 
profile roles in economic and financial policymaking and in influencing 
the development of international financial regulation. 
In this vein, the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates (“Joint Fo-
rum”) and the FSB57 have both been characterized as intergovernmental 
standard-setting bodies. They are composed of regulators and supervisors 
from the G10 and G20 countries and some large emerging market coun-
tries, and of representatives from other G10 standard-setting bodies. Es-
tablished in 1996 under the aegis of the BCBS, IAIS, and IOSCO,58 the 
Joint Forum issues legally nonbinding documents and principles. In con-
trast to its constituent international bodies, the Joint Forum has estab-
lished a set of principles designed to assist regulated entities in determin-
ing the minimum steps they should take when considering outsourcing 
activities. These include creating a coherent policy and specific man-
agement plan for programs as well as deciding the types of issues that 
should be considered in contracts. The principles also contain some 
broad standards to help supervisors.59 It develops its principles in con-
junction with IOSCO, which produced the Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation in 1998.60 The Joint Forum’s principles are in its 
own words “high-level and cross-sectoral, designed to provide a mini-
mum benchmark” for all financial institutions.61 In contrast to the IOSCO 
principles, the Joint Forum minimum benchmarks are complementary 
and designed specifically for securities firms. 
                                                                                                             
 57. The FSB, formerly the Financial Stability Forum, was “re-established” at the G20 
Summit in London in April 2009. See G20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial 
System—London 1 (Apr. 2, 2009). The FSB will play a higher-profile role than its prede-
cessor, the FSF, in monitoring global financial stability. Specifically, it will establish a 
supervisory college to monitor each of the largest international financial services firms. It 
will monitor a firm's financial and operational structure, and any contingency funding 
arrangements, and will act as a clearing house for information sharing and contingency 
planning for the benefit of its member countries. Id. 
 58. ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 50. 
 59. Id. 
 60. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION (1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf. 
 61. Bank for Int’l Settlements, Joint Forum Provides Outsourcing Guidance to the 
Financial Sector (Aug. 2, 2004) http://www.bis.org/press/p040802.htm. 
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The FSB consists of the twenty countries that compose the G20.62 It 
coordinates activities relating to issues common to the banking, securi-
ties, and insurance sectors. As the common body of three international 
financial bodies, the BCBS, the IAIS, and IOSCO, the FSB sets soft law 
in the form of guidance, and issues reports producing principles of pru-
dential regulation, international cooperation between supervisors, execu-
tive compensation in financial firms, accounting standards, tax havens, 
and non-cooperative jurisdictions. It also collaborates with the IMF in 
conducting early warning exercises. 
These international bodies lack the requisite attributes of an interna-
tional organization, namely, they are not subject to international law, and 
do not have international personality, the capacity to conclude treaties, or 
international legal immunities. It is precisely because of these nonlegal 
attributes that these international standard-setting bodies—composed of 
state representatives and international organizations—have been praised 
for having a more flexible decision-making structure with a powerful 
normative component that significantly influences the development of 
national economic law and regulatory practices. Indeed, the type of in-
ternational financial standard setting engaged in by the Basel Committee 
has been praised as an alternative form of international lawmaking with-
out the burden of cumbersome treaty formation rules and the imprecise— 
and often politically impractical—requirements for the formation of cus-
tomary international law. The international financial standard-setting 
bodies have been praised for being more effective in adopting economi-
cally beneficial regulatory norms and standards for most countries, while 
exercising far more influence over state economic and regulatory prac-
tice than the influence exerted by many formal international and regional 
economic organizations.63 The worldwide credit crisis, however, has 
called the efficacy of this flexible and unstructured international deci-
sion-making process into question. 
IV. THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND THE WORLDWIDE CREDIT CRISIS 
Although the flexible and secretive manner in which the Basel Com-
mittee and the other G10 committees have conducted their deliberations 
and standard setting has generally been considered a strength in the effec-
tiveness of their governance structures and decision-making processes,64 
                                                                                                             
 62. The G20 countries are the same countries that are members of the Basel Commit-
tee. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 63. See ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 136–39. 
 64. The unstructured and secretive deliberations process has been praised because it 
allows regulators to respond quickly to rapidly changing developments in financial mar-
kets. See Jackson, supra note 38. 
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it has also had the unfortunate result of exposing them to special interest 
group pressure from major banks and international finance associations.65 
Most of the major international banks and their advocates used the more 
flexible institutional structure of the Basel Committee with its opaque 
decision-making processes to lobby regulators and central bankers to 
adopt more market-sensitive regulatory capital requirements. This led to 
weaker capital adequacy measurement processes for banks, which re-
sulted in lower bank capital levels that did not cover the social costs (or 
negative externalities) of bank lending and overall risk-taking.66 Moreo-
ver, Basel II did not address the serious liquidity risks which banks were 
exposed to through securitization and other forms of credit risk transfer. 
The combination of the banks’ exposure to liquidity risk in securitization 
markets and to higher levels of credit risk and market risk, because the 
Basel II models permitted banks to hold far lower levels of regulatory 
capital than what was socially optimal, created serious systemic risk to 
the global financial system and contributed significantly to the causes of 
the global credit and financial market crisis of 2007–2009.67 Essentially, 
Basel II permitted regulators to approve more market-risk sensitive capi-
tal models, which led to lower levels of regulatory capital and created an 
incentive for banks to increase their leverage levels in the structured 
finance and securitization markets.68 
The failure of the Basel Committee and other international financial 
standard-setting bodies to anticipate the virulent risks created in the fi-
nancial system over the last ten years has resulted in tremendous criti-
cism of the bodies and the G10 committees for their failure to oversee 
adequately the international standard-setting process. The Basel Commit-
tee’s failure to adopt regulatory capital standards that would require 
banks to manage their balance sheets in a more socially compatible man-
ner resulted in high levels of leverage in the global financial system that 
contributed significantly to the causes of the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. In other words, the lack of transpa-
rency and accountability in the Committee’s decision-making structure, 
and the bankers’ excessive influence on the regulators who were mem-
bers of the Committee, resulted in the leading G10 countries adopting 
                                                                                                             
 65. For example, the Institute for International Finance in Washington D.C. 
 66. Indeed, a major impetus for Basel II was the lobbying of major multinational 
banks and their trade associations, which wanted the eight-percent capital adequacy stan-
dard of the 1988 Capital Accord lowered significantly to reflect more approximately the 
economic capital levels that bank risk models suggested they hold to protect the invest-
ment capital of bank shareholders. 
 67. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 34, at 2–7. 
 68. Id. 
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weak bank capital standards, thereby bringing about the world econo-
my’s fall into a serious economic recession. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal implications of the international financial standards produced 
by these bodies have raised important questions regarding the definition, 
relevance, and development of international economic law. The growing 
importance of the international financial standards, such as the Basel 
Capital Accord, and their acceptance by most countries for their domes-
tic regulatory systems have demonstrated the importance of international 
financial soft law in influencing state practice. It has also shown that 
States in the financial regulatory arena have a certain disregard for using 
traditional public international law to govern state practice and the opera-
tions of global financial markets. 
The current enthusiasm for international financial soft law standards 
has two disquieting implications. First, many governments not actively 
involved in the Basel standard-setting process are suffering an involunta-
ry loss of sovereignty, as they have not been involved in the negotiation 
and design of the international standards. This loss is at odds with the 
general presumption in international law that governments are sovereign 
unless they decide to cede their sovereignty. Moreover, the growing ob-
ligation for States to adopt the Basel standards without representation in 
the standard-setting process calls into question the accountability and 
legitimacy of the Basel Committee. Perhaps, the G10’s effective mono-
poly on decision making should be ended by allowing other countries 
that are also representative of the global financial system to have a seat at 
the table. 
Second, as a matter of economic policy, if those designing the stan-
dards maintain the fiction that they are voluntary when in fact they are 
not, the content of the standards is likely to be suboptimal for economic 
growth and financial development, as is demonstrated with the recent 
financial crisis. Future research should elaborate what role international 
economic law should play in enhancing the institutional structure of de-
cision making in order to achieve financial stability and development 
objectives. Moreover, the catastrophic financial crisis that has plagued 
Western financial markets from 2007 to the present raises important is-
sues regarding the governance structure of the G10 committees and in 
particular the standard-setting competence of the Basel Committee, 
whose regulatory standards have completely failed in protecting the 
global financial system and in providing an efficacious, prudential regu-
latory model for future financial development. 
